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Abstract 
By examining IT system procurement between U.S. Credit Unions (CUs) and IT vendors, we present 
descriptive analyses showing that firms’ outsourcing decisions might be interrelated to each other through 
suppliers’ market entry decisions. The buyer-supplier match in the market might also play an important 
role in determining firms’ boundaries. We also argue that market thickness along the product space might 
determine the characteristics of input that is procured through the market. 
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Section 1 Introduction 
What makes firms outsource a part of their production process? This fundamental question in the theory 
of the firm has been attracting significant attention from researchers in both theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. While the development of this literature has deepened our understanding of firms’ 
outsourcing decisions, the vast majority of these studies have considered a firm’s outsourcing decision as 
an independent bilateral relation between an upstream and a downstream firm (Holmström and Roberts, 
1998). 
  In this paper, we conduct descriptive analyses to examine whether firms’ outsourcing decisions 
might in fact be interrelated to each other, through suppliers’ market entry decisions. As more firms 
demand a particular feature of an input, it is possible that a supplier enters the market producing the input 
with the feature (market thickness effect). The firms whose preference is different from others may not be 
able to find a good “match” with any supplier and might decide to produce the input in-house.  
We examine IT system procurement between U.S. Credit Unions (CUs) and IT vendors. The IT 
system for CUs is used for data-processing (DP) of routine data management and Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM). IT system often refers to software, hardware, and IT staffs who perform the DP. 
CUs’ IT system is procured in two main forms, Vendor-Online (VOL) and Vendor In-House (VIH), 
which is distinguished by what (software or DP) is procured through the market. In the VIH case, CUs 
procure software from a software vendor and perform DP with their own IT staffs. In the VOL case, CUs 
procure DP from a DP vendor, which manages their entire IT system. The adoption of VOL means a 
higher degree of outsourcing for CUs. 
We examine the patterns of (i) procurement forms (VIH or VOL) of IT system adopted by 
different CUs, (ii) CU-vendor (buyer-supplier) matches, and (iii) CUs’ vendor switching. Note that, VIH 
facilitates less outsourcing compared to VOL, as CUs adopting VIH perform DP themselves. However, 
VIH still involves the market transaction of software. This allows us to examine the patterns of market 
transactions where firms adopt different degrees of outsourcing.  We report the patterns of the above (ii) 
and (iii) for CUs adopting VIH and VOL separately, and provide possible explanations that are consistent 
with the observed outsourcing patterns (i.e. (i)).  
  We complement our data with a field study on CUs’ IT system procurement, based on trade 
magazines and our interviews with large IT vendors for CUs and industry specialists. This helps us to 
understand how diverse CU preferences are over DP characteristics and how differentiated the software or 
DP can be across vendors. Several variables seem associated with such heterogeneity in DP preference. 
Among them, we use the size of a CU as a proxy for a CU's preference. The field study also helps us to 
identify the sources of relationship-specific investment that may be necessary when a CU uses a particular 
vendor’s software or DP.  
  Main findings are as follows; 1) The likelihood that CUs use VOL is high for medium-size CUs 
and low for both small and large CUs, and 2) for both software and DP transactions, vendors seem to 3 
 
differentiate their products. In particular, while CUs adopting VIH are more diverse than those adopting 
VOL in terms of their size, each software vendor seems to focus on servicing CUs in the same size 
category; within-vendor variation of CUs is similar between VIH and VOL. We also found that 3) a CU is 
more likely to switch vendors when its characteristics are more different from the vendor’s typical CU. 
Given that the CU switches vendors, the CU also tends to choose a vendor whose typical clients are 
similar to the CU. 
  Based on such observations and our field study, we argue that CUs are heterogeneous in 
preference over the product space of DP. It might be more costly for a vendor to service a CU who is 
more different from the vendor’s typical CU, because the vendor has to adjust its product to satisfy the 
CU’s preference. The adjustment might incur relationship-specific investments, which may be bore by the 
vendor or CU. Thus, the vendor services only a section of the market instead of servicing CUs with 
diverse preferences. Such investment may be essential for the transaction of both software and DP, as we 
observe that, both software and DP vendors seem to differentiate their products, each servicing a section 
of the market. However, a relationship-specific investment may be more essential for VOL, because DP is 
a more complete input as compared to software.  Thus, in the VOL case, vendors are concentrated in a 
segment of DP product space with many CUs with similar preferences, i.e. a thick market along the 
product space. In a thin market over the CU’s DP preference, CUs choose to perform DP in-house, 
because the “investment” or the adjustment to any DP being provided in the market would be too large as 
compared to the costs of internal provision. 
Our study is unique in several points as compared to the existent work in the literature on firm 
boundaries. First, our data provide us with a unique opportunity to observe the pattern of the combination 
of all firms matched to a particular supplier, allowing us to study on how suppliers’ decisions on the 
characteristics of their products may be important in understanding firm boundaries. The strategy of 
suppliers in the market has been abstracted in the literature of the theory of the firm, as the market 
transaction is assumed always superior without the existence of asset specificities. 
Second, the panel feature of our data provides us a rare opportunity to observe both supplier 
switching and procurement forms. It is a well-known notion that a market transaction of a specific input 
imposes potential supplier switching costs, and firms might decide to procure such an input in-house 
instead of through the market to avoid the risk of hold-up problems. By observing both, we can examine 
whether the supplier switching behavior of those who outsource can also be explained by the degree of 
specificity of the input transacted between firms and suppliers. No existing empirical study on firm 
boundaries has examined the behavior of supplier switching.
1 In addition, most empirical studies on 
                                                            
1  Based on the Transaction Cost (TC) theory, those which select market procurement require relatively less specific 
input. For example, Monteverde and Teece (1982) find that automobile assembler firms tend to vertically integrate 
the production of more firm-specific auto components and interpret it as a result of firms’ avoiding potential 4 
 
supplier or brand switching (ex. Chintagunta, 1998) focus on the transaction of consumer goods or the 
market when procurement style alternatives to the market is not realistic. We also observe the patterns of 
market transaction for software when firms produce DP in-house. This allows us to consider how the 
suppliers’ strategy in entering the market for both complete and semi-complete products may interact with 
firms’ degree of outsourcing.  
  Finally, as compared to the existing studies on the effect of market thickness (Hubbard, 2001; 
Pirrong, 1993; Ono, 2008), which looked at the role of market thickness that vary across geographical 
areas, we address the role of market thickness that vary across product space. The relative similarity and 
difference between their preferences may be associated with the level of relationship-specific investment 
necessary in the market transaction. 
  In Section2, we outline CUs’ business operation and their use of IT systems. Section 3 describes 
organization forms of IT procurement. Section 4 describes our data set. Section 5 focuses on presenting 
the different characteristics between CUs adopting VIH and VOL. Section 6 presents the patterns of 
within-vendor distribution of firms. Section 7 presents the patterns of vendor switching. Section 8 
concludes providing possible stories behind the observed patterns. 
 
Section 2 Background: CUs and IT systems 
CUs are financial institutions that provide services to their members (customers). CUs offer not only 
checking and saving accounts but also a wider array of financial services including more sophisticated 
saving and investment options as well as personal loans and mortgages; the specific product offerings 
vary across CUs. CUs are non-profit organizations and are entitled to preferential tax treatment, but they 
can draw customers only from the limited group defined by their field of membership; thus, managing the 
operation costs is essential for CUs.  
Like many cooperatives, the members of CUs elect the board, who appoint a manager or a 
management team, who make various operational decisions. In small CUs, managers perform various 
roles including IT management. Any surplus is returned to the members as a form of high interest rates, 
etc. In that sense, members are residual claimants and board members who represent members’ interest 
have incentive to choose a manager who operates the CU efficiently.
2  
Like other financial service providers, CUs need to perform DP, which include not only routine 
data management but also Customer Relationship Management (CRM). Routine data management 
includes recording, summarizing, and archiving transaction records as well as to secure such data and 
perform daily trouble shooting. CRM includes analyzing strategies on pricing, promotions, and other 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
switching costs. The paper does not present, however, any observations or anecdotal evidence that assemblers do 
switch suppliers for the products that they outsource.  
2 See Emmons and Schmid (2000) for a discussion. 5 
 
sales to improve their financial services, increase assets and sales, and retain members. CRM is 
considered a critical input for financial institutions (Knittel and Stango, 2008).
3 While CUs are non-profit 
organizations, CRM is still considered essential for CU survival.  
  Software functions define the kinds of financial products that CUs can offer, which determine the 
kinds of routine data management. Software functions also decide the kinds of analyses that can be 
performed for CRM. However, there are various ways DP could be heterogeneous among users of the 
same software. CUs may have different preferences in how trouble shootings are performed as well as for 
securing data. Given software functions, CUs perform CRM, focusing on different issues and creating 
different strategies dependent on their particular environments and needs. While CUs are typically smaller 
than banks, their preferences seem diverse as they differ in size, the base of potential members, and 
characteristics of members (income, ethnic group, occupation, community, etc.).  The diversity of CUs’ 
preferences on DP characteristics may influence their choice of how to procure IT systems as well as 
which vendors to choose. 
 
Section 3 IT system procurement forms and the transaction cost theory 
IT procurement forms 
There are mainly two forms of IT system procurement, VIH and VOL. In the VIH case, a CU procures 
licensed software from a software vendor and performs DP in-house through its own IT staffs. The 
software is installed typically on a CU's hardware or comes with hardware in case of a so-called turn-key 
system.
4 In contrast, in the VOL case, an entire IT system resides at a vendor site (often called a service 
bureau), and a CU purchases DP from a vendor. A vendor performs DP using its own IT staffs and its 
software installed on its own hardware.
5  The clients communicate with the service bureau through 
terminals connecting to the vendor’s servers.   
                                                            
3 For example, calculating the return on investment (ROI) for a specific investment requires software and 
examination on whether it is tightly aligned with the CU’s particular product. The CU may also examine a specific 
product penetration and which specific members are responding. By doing so, many CUs decide who to target, 
which members to wave fees and which members to let go. (Source: Credit Union Magazine (March 1, 2005) “CRM 
success depends more on strategy than software”)  
4 The turn-key system is pre-packaged with both software and hardware.  
5 The CU data resides on the vendor's system and is transmitted to the service bureau through terminals (often PCs) 
connecting to the vendor's servers by a network, such as the internet.   6 
 
  Note that a small fraction of CUs produce software itself.
6 We exclude these CUs to focus on the 
difference between the above two forms. In the VIH case, our field study suggests that the extent of the 
customization of licensed software is limited, and that open source license is rare, while CUs can 
purchase add-one, which are typically purchased from the same vendor for its core software. 
 
Relationship-specific investment for DP 
Because of CUs’ diverse preference over DP characteristics, in the VOL case, a vendor has to learn each 
of its client’s preferences and adjust its DP; in fact, many VOL vendors claim that they customize their 
DP for each CU. The more different is a CU’s preference from the vendor’s typical CU, the larger the 
necessary relationship-specific investment may be. Whether such costs are bore by the vendor or the CU, 
the particular investment is only valuable for that particular combination of vendor and CU.  
    As TC theory argues, when such relationship-specific investment is necessary, under the 
environment when complexity and uncertainty induce contractual incompleteness, one or both parties 
face the risk of opportunistic behavior (ex-post bargaining after the relationship-specific investment is 
made), the ex-ante investment would be inefficient. 
In the VIH case, because DP is performed in-house, the risk of hold-up from the relationship-
specific investment is considered mitigated.
7  Moreover, if the specificity arises only because of the 
relative difference between the CU and other clients of a vendor, in the VIH case, “specificity” may not 
actually exist, because the CU’s IT staffs perform DP for only one CU. 
Note, however, that the use of a VIH system does not remove all the issues due to market 
transactions, because CUs using a VIH system still have to purchase software (semi-complete input), 
which is used to produce DP (complete input). Because the necessary trainings (for CUs’ IT staffs) are 
specific to a particular vendor’s software, there would also be a risk of hold-up. However, by performing 








6 In our study periods, 7% of all CUs developed software, while 64% used VIH and 26% used VOL. Apart from 
these CUs, 2.4% reported that they used manual systems, and 1.3% reported that they used other arrangements. 
These CUs are also excluded from our study. 
7 As Lafontaine and Slade (2007) point out, TC theory does not discuss much about how the opportunistic behaviors 
by employees is mitigated.  7 
 
Section 4 Data 
We use the NCUA Call Report data,
 8 which record the characteristics of essentially all CUs including the 
information on their IT systems. The survey starts collecting the name of the vendor in December 1996. 
We use the semi-annual (June and December) data between December 1996 and December 2006.  
  Among all CUs in the original data, most CUs adopt VIH or VOL defined in Section 3 when 
procuring IT systems. As we mentioned above, we exclude a small fraction of CUs that use manual or 
entirely in-house developed systems. To increase the accuracy of identifying vendor information, we also 
drop some fraction of CUs whose vendor names are not verified by other sources.
9 This leaves roughly 
6,700 CUs per period; during our sample period, the number of CUs declines from about 7,000 to 6,000 
due to M&As as well as exits. On average, in our sample, 70% CUs use VIH, and 30% use VOL. 
  
Section 5 CU characteristics and their choices on IT system procurement form 
As Table 1 shows, CUs are quite heterogeneous. Small CUs service only a couple of hundred members, 
while the size of large CUs is compatible with some banks. The number of members is highly correlated 
with CUs’ asset size; the correlation coefficient is .96 in terms of logarithm. Our field study seems to 
suggest that the difference in CU size is one of the important factors that differentiate CUs’ preferences 
over DP characteristics. In this paper, we use the log number of members at a CU as a variable 
corresponding to a particular DP preference over the DP product space. 
Note that while we cannot observe details of DP characteristics (especially the one related to 
CRM) that each CU performs, we at least observe characteristics of their software managing IT system 
based on the information on the kinds of financial services. The variation of financial products that CUs 
offer differentiates not only the routine data management but also the kinds of CRM that have to be 
performed (CUs providing small and large number of financial products may have to adopt different 
strategies). Our data provide information on CUs’ offering of some selected advanced products, including 
fixed-rate mortgages, variable-rate mortgages, credit card loans, auto loans, home equity loans, business 
                                                            
8 The NCUA data serve as the analogue to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)'s Call Reports for 
commercial banks and are the source of records for balance sheets, income, and other information about CUs. 
9  The vendor names are reported by each CU in the data, and the name of the vendor is sometimes reported 
differently across reporting CUs and periods. To identify supplier switching accurately it is important to verify 
(clean) the vendor name with other sources. For such small vendors, however, it is difficult to verify the vendor’s 
name information. We exclude a small fraction of CUs using relatively small vendors. In particular, we exclude CUs 
that ever use vendors that did not reach a certain size (20 CU clients) during our sample period. In order to exclude 
CUs miss-reporting their procurement form, we also exclude a vendor's particular procurement form if the number 
of its CU clients is fewer than ten during the sample periods. (30% of  CUs using VIH and VOL are excluded from 
this procedure) 8 
 
loans, money market, IRA/KEOGH, and share certificates. Typically, CUs increment their product 
offerings starting from a basic product such as auto loan to a more sophisticated product such as variable 
rate mortgage.
10 Thus, the count of these advanced financial products summarizes the variation of product 
offerings. Figure 1 shows how the number of advanced financial products is correlated with CU size. The 
CUs offering more advanced products are larger, which is consistent with our view based on our field 
study. 
  Figure 2 shows the distribution of CU size (log number of member) by IT system procurement 
form based on the data in June, 2003. We can see distinct differences between procurement forms. The 
size distribution of CUs adopting VIH is more diverse than those adopting VOL; the inter-quartile 
distance (IQD) of the log number of a CU's membership is 2.34 for CUs adopting VIH and 1.21 for CUs 
adopting VOL.  
  In Figure 3, we plot the predicted probability that a CU adopts VOL based on a Probit analysis 
where the regressors are CU size and the squared CU size. The CUs in both tails of the size distribution 
seem more likely to adopt VIH than medium-sized CUs. We found the same tendency using log assets of 
a CU as a measure of CU size.  
As we mentioned in Section 1, such a pattern of adoption of procurement forms may be reflecting 
the CUs’ heterogeneous preferences over DP as well as the entry of vendors providing software and those 
providing DP in the market. In the next section, we report vendor characteristics as well as the match 
between CUs and vendors to learn more about vendors’ behaviors. 
  
Section 6 Vendor characteristics and within-vendor distribution of CU characteristics 
Vendor characteristics  
Our sample consists of 46 vendors per period, on average. While some vendors cater to both VIH and 
VOL forms of IT procurement and selling software and DP to different CUs, in this paper, we treat each 
division of a vendor, separately, but we intend to take this into account in our future work. In June 2003, 
we identify 34 VOL vendors and 24 VIH vendors; 18 vendors offer both VIH and VOL. 
Vendor sizes are diverse. In June 2003, the number of CUs per vendor is 24 at the 25th percentile 
and 143 at the 75
th percentile, while there are also some very large vendors such as Fiserv with over 1,800 
CU clients. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explain the degree of market concentration for IT 
services for CUs, it is instructive to note that the market seems concentrated. For example, in June 2003, 
the top 3 vendors represent 50% of the market, while the other 50% is shared by 37 vendors. The market 
                                                            
10 Most basic services after saving and checking accounts seems to be auto loans (99% of CUs in our data offer auto 
loan), then share certificates, and then IRAs. The variable rate mortgage seems to be the most sophisticated among 
the products we observe (only 9% of CUs in our data offer this product). 
 9 
 
share of the top 3 is high in each market for software and DP. Looking at vendor size by procurement 
form in Table 2, we notice that DP vendors have fewer numbers of CUs than software vendors, reflecting 
the nature of DP production. 
 
Within-vendor distribution of CU characteristics 
In Table 3, we summarize characteristics of CUs per vendor for each procurement form. First, let us look 
at the variation of CU characteristics that vendors might be targeting when they decide the basic 
characteristics of their products. The variation of such targets may give us an idea of how differentiated 
the vendors’ products are. We use the median CU size of a given vendor as a proxy for such a variable. 
The within-vendor median CU sizes are less diverse for DP vendors than software vendors. The variation 
of vendor’s targets seems to reflect that of the CU population distribution by IT procurement form.  
More interestingly, the within-vendor variation of CU sizes is similar between VIH and VOL, 
based on the IQD of CU sizes within a vendor. For VIH, the within-vendor IQD of CU size is 1.15 on 
average, which is much smaller than the IQD of sizes of all CUs adopting VIH (2.34). For VOL, the 
contrast is small, but the within-vendor IQD of CU sizes is on average still smaller (1.06) than that of the 
overall IQD (1.21). It is possible, responding to CUs’ heterogeneous DP preferences, vendors 
differentiate their products over product space, servicing only a section of the market. Such a tendency 
seems especially strong for software vendors, where it is much less clear for DP vendors.  
We also note that the within-vendor median CU size is more similar among DP vendors than 
among software vendors. The standard deviation of the within-vendor median CU size is 1.2 for software 
vendors, but 0.67 for DP vendors. This may be reflecting various things. A DP vendor may have more 
incentive to service CUs with similar DP preferences than software vendors, because DP transaction may 
incur larger relationship-specific investments. At the same time, CUs may also have an incentive to adopt 
VOL only if there is a vendor providing DP that matches closely to their preferences so that necessary 
adjustments would be small. Following such stories, it is possible that DP vendors can enter only in the 
dense market around the medium- sized CUs in the CU population.  
Of course, the observed patterns may also be reflecting many other factors that determine the 
combination of CUs serviced by a vendor. Such factors may include CUs’ product offerings, location, 
field of membership, tenure with a particular vendor, etc. These other factors may also explain why the 
within-vendor CU size distribution overlaps between vendors. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 show the within-
vendor CU size distribution for vendors with 20 or more CU clients. The within-vendor CU size seems to 
overlap especially among DP vendors. However, as we discuss in Section 7, even in the VOL case, CUs 





Section 7 Vendor switching patterns 
In this section, we examine the patterns of vendor switching by CUs. When CUs’ preferences over DP 
characteristics are heterogeneous, it is possible that the level of “match” between a CU’s preference and a 
particular vendor’s base product varies across the CUs transacting with the same vendor. It is possible 
that the more different a CU is from a vendor’s typical CU, it is more costly for the vendor or the CU 
because of the necessary level of relationship-specific investment. While we observe the match between a 
vendor and the CUs in equilibrium, because both software and DP transactions involves long-term 
contract of typically 5 years, it is possible that some changes in vendor and/or CU characteristics motivate 
a CU to switch or a vendor to let go of some CUs instead of adjusting their product to a CU’s preference 
change. 
 
Definition of vendor switching 
We identify vendor switching based on the vendor names reported by CUs in the data. In our sample, the 
total number of vendors falls from around 50 to less than 40, reflecting M&A activity, among IT vendors. 
When we observe that the change in vendor name reported by a CU corresponds to a M&A, we do not 
consider them to be a vendor-switching; we supplement our data by external sources to check which 
vendors are acquired and merged. In the sense that we do not capture CUs that intended to switch to an 
acquiring vendor regardless of M&A, we under-identify vendor switchings. Of all CUs in our sample, 
about 2.9% of CUs switch vendors between 6 month periods.  
  We also note that 1.7% of CUs switch IT procurement forms between 6 month periods. In 
particular, during our sample period, VIH seems to have become slightly more popular, increasing the 
number of CUs adopting this form from 68% to 70%; 3% of CUs adopting VOL switch to VIH between 6 
month periods. In this paper, we focus on examining the patterns of vendor switchings focusing on CUs 
that did not switch procurement forms, while we intend to incorporate the CUs’ switchings of 
procurement forms in future work. 
 
Patterns of vendor switching: vendor’s market segment  
Is a vendor switching motivated to increase the degree of “match”? Here, we illustrate how the degree of 
“match” between a CU and a vendor is different before and after the vendor switch. To do that, we first 
create a measure of the “match” by calculating the distance between a CU and a vendor's typical (median) 
CU in terms of CU size, and standardize the distance by dividing it by the standard deviation of CU sizes 
of the vendor. We denote such a standardized distance by dij(t) for CU i using vendor j in period t. The 
positive (negative) number indicates that a CU is larger (smaller) than the vendor’s median CU. 
In Figure 4, we plot dij(t) against dij(t-1) for the CUs that switch vendors as well as for the CUs 
that stay with the same vendors between two consecutive periods. Figure 4-1 is for CUs adopting VIH in 
both periods, and Figure 4-2 is for those adopting VOL in both periods. In both cases, for stayers, dij 11 
 
changes only by a small amount, because CU size and the combination of CUs within the same vendor do 
not change much in a 6 month interval; thus, stayers are plotted along a 45 degree line. For CUs that 
switch vendors, we can see that, the distance shrinks after the switch. CUs seem to switch to a vendor 
targeting a CU more similar to themselves; the slope of the fitted line for switchers is less steep than that 
for stayers (45 degree line).  
Such findings are complemented by Figure 5, where, for CUs that switch vendors, we examine 
the difference in the characteristics of base product between an incumbent and a new vendor. The Y-axis 
shows the difference in the median CU size between the new and the incumbent vendors; the positive 
number indicates that the new vendor is targeting a larger CU, and the negative number indicates that the 
new vendor is targeting a smaller CU. The X-axis is the switchers’ distance (not an absolute distance) in 
the within-vendor distribution of the incumbent vendor. The positive (negative) number indicates that a 
new vendor targets a larger (smaller) CU than an incumbent vendor.  
We can see that, among switchers, the CUs in the right tail of the incumbent vendors tend to 
switch to vendors focusing on larger CUs than their incumbent vendor, and the CUs in the left tail of the 
incumbent vendors tend to switch to vendors focusing on smaller CUs. In both cases, the “match” tends to 
be improved. 
Such patterns of vendor switchings may be reflecting the incentive by both the CU and vendor to 
improve “match.” The improved match may reduce the costs of future opportunistic behaviors as we 
discussed above. Recall that we observed that DP vendors’ typical CUs are similar across vendors. 
However, switchers still seem to distinguish DP vendors by the combination of their clients and tend to 
switch to the vendor whose target is more similar to them.  
 
Who switch out of incumbent vendors? 
So far, we have looked at the match between a vendor and a CU in terms of CU size. However, as we 
noted above, various other factors may influence the match. We test whether we still observe the above 
tendencies even after controlling for other factors.  In particular, we examine whether the likelihood that a 
CU switches out of its incumbent vendor increases with its relative size to the vendor’s other CUs, after 
controlling for other variables. As a key variable, we include the absolute distance between a CU and the 
incumbent vendor’s median CU in terms of size. Instead of including the standardized distance, we 
include the standard deviation of CU sizes for each incumbent vendor, separately from the distance 
measure, in order to see whether the variation of CU sizes at a vendor has a different effect. Below, we 
summarize the motivation to include other variables. 
 
Other variables 
Geography may matter for vendor switchings for various reasons. First, the CUs in the same locality may 
communicate with each other to exchange ideas in order to improve the efficiency of their operations. 12 
 
Second, it is possible that CUs prefer to transact with the vendor that has an office in their locality so that 
they can maintain better communication; this may be more important especially when CUs adopt VOL, 
because the CUs rely on vendors more for the final characteristics of DP. In addition, if CUs are similar 
within the same locality, what we observed above may be reflecting CUs switching to a vendor that has 
an office in their locality.  
  To control for these effects, we include the measure of how intensely a CU’s incumbent vendor 
services the CU’s locality. As such a measure, we use the locality’s share in the number of the vendor’s 
clients. As we show in Appendix 1, different vendors seem to have different geographical nodes. In the 
area with a high share of the vendor’s clients, the clients may communicate more to support each other in 
using the particular vendor’s system. The high share may also be correlated with the likelihood that the 
vendor has its own office to assist clients in their locality. Even if the vendor does not have a physical 
office, it is possible that the vendor can save costs of travel if face-to-face communications are necessary. 
  We also include a variable to indicate whether a CU offers more financial products than other 
clients of its incumbent vendor. Our field study indicates that it is costly for a vendor to expand the 
functionality of software for a few clients. We include a dummy variable indicating the CUs offering the 
maximum number of financial products among a vendor’s clients. It is possible that such CUs are facing a 
restriction in expanding their product offerings, and may be more likely to switch vendors. At the same 
time, the vendor may not be willing to expand their product offerings for only a few CUs. It is, however, 
possible that the vendor has already made specific investments to service such CUs.
11 In such a case, the 
vendor may be more motivated to keep such CUs.  
  We also control for CU size. Including a large CU would increase a vendor’s scale more than 
including a small CU. It is possible that the vendor may try to keep a large CU by, for example, offering a 
lower price. We also control for the size of the incumbent vendor. Large vendors having more scale 
economy may satisfy their clients more, in general.  
  Finally, we include a dummy indicating the CUs using the incumbent vendor for the last 5 years 
or more. While the length of contracts varies, our field study suggests that a typical contract period is 5 
years. A CU may more likely to switch after the initial five year has passed. While we cannot identify 
when exactly a contract started for most CUs, we can at least identify whether the CU used a particular 
vendor for the last 5 years or more; we exclude CUs for which we do not have observations of the 
previous 5 years. Note that the tenure with a vendor may also represent “revealed preference.” The CUs 





11 Of course, it is possible that because a vendor knows that the CU is not switching, it invested to service this CU. 13 
 
Results 
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 summarize the results of the logit analyses. We also perform fixed-effect logit 
analyses, in which we control for CU-specific effects. The qualitative results are similar between VIH and 
VOL. We found that, even after controlling for other variables, the absolute distance is positively 
correlated with the probability that a CU switches out of its incumbent vendor, consistent to our 
explanation. Note that when we replace the absolute distance with the CU size and squared CU size to 
allow the effect of CU size to be estimated flexibly, only the squared CU size obtained a significant sign. 
The CUs at either tail of the within-vendor distribution seem to have more incentive to switch. If 
there are any costs of switching, it is possible that such CUs might have stayed with the incumbent vendor 
until the disadvantage from staying exceeded switching costs. The incumbent vendor may not adjust the 
characteristics of its product for such CUs that deviate “too much” from the vendor’s target; adjusting the 
product for such CUs would impose so much risk of opportunistic behavior that the vendor may decide to 
let go of such CUs. 
  Geography seems to matter. The high concentration of the incumbent vendor’s clients in the CU’s 
locality is negatively associated with the CU’s likelihood to switch out. This possibly reflects the effect of 
distance to the vendor’s office as well as the effect of communications among CUs using the same 
vendor’s product.  
Vendor size is negatively correlated with the CU’s likelihood to switch out. While this is 
consistent with the story of greater scale economies with larger vendor, it may also reflect many 
unobserved vendor-specific factors. Note that CU size does not obtain significant coefficients nor does 
the dummy indicating the CUs offering the maximum number of financial products. 
Interestingly, the standard deviation of CU sizes for an incumbent vendor is positively associated 
with the CU’s likelihood to switch for VIH, but the effect is insignificant for VOL. There may be various 
ways to interpret such a difference. It is possible that providing the product that can be used to diverse 
characteristics of CUs reduces the overall quality of the product. For example, software vendors may 
allocate less resource to customer service for existing clients while allocating more resource to enhance 
software functionalities for more diverse clients. In the VOL case, it is possible that CUs monitor vendors 
more closely because they entirely depend on vendors for the performance of DP. 
  Finally, the dummy indicating the CUs using its incumbent vendor for 5 or more years obtains 
negative and significant coefficients in the logit analyses, but obtains positive coefficients in the fixed 
effect logit analyses. In the fixed effect logit, where we control for CUs’ unobserved preferences, it seems 
that the variable captures the fact that after 5 years the contract may be less binding and there would be 





Given CU switches, which vendor is chosen? 
Next we examine whether a switcher’s choice of a new vendor is consistent with the static patterns of 
vendor-CU match. Among alternative vendors, is the vendor whose typical CU is closest to the CU (in 
terms of size) more likely to be chosen?  
We perform a multinomial logit where a switcher chooses a new vendor among alternative 
vendors. In the VIH (VOL) case, the choice set consists of all the vendors that supply software (DP). Note 
that, here, we evaluate the vendor’s characteristics in period t-1 and that of CUs in period t, and we 
examine the CU’s choice of a new vendor between t-1 and t.  
We include a dummy indicating the vendors whose product (software or DP) did not supports (in 
t-1) the offerings of financial products that the CU offers in t. It may be difficult for a vendor to expand its 
product characteristics for one or a few number of new CUs. The results indicate that it may be extremely 
unlikely that the vendor expands the functionalities of its product for new CUs. This is an extreme 
example indicating a vendor may decide to supply its product only if the necessary relationship-specific 
investment does not exceed a certain level. 
Again, geography seems to matter. Given that a CU switches vendors, the CU is more likely to 
choose a vendor that has a geographical “node” in the CU’s local region. Such geographical node may 
change over time for each vendor, because of the change in geographical distribution of their clients; the 
most dramatic case would be due to M&As between vendors. It is possible that as a vendor’s 
geographical node moves across regions, the cost of communication between a vendor and a particular 
client may also change. 
Finally, vendor size is positively associated with the likelihood that the vendor is chosen, again 
possibly reflecting scale economy effects. The standard deviation of CU sizes within a vendor is 
negatively associated with the probability of the vendor being chosen in the VIH case, but such effect is 
not statistically significant in the VOL case. This is consistent with what we found for the CUs switching 
out of an incumbent vendor. 
 
Section 8 Conclusion 
In this paper, we document stylized facts that seem to suggest that firms’ outsourcing decisions are in fact 
interrelated to each other. Examining the match between IT vendor and CU, we found that (1) CUs are 
more likely to adopt VOL when their sizes are close to the average, (2) CUs of similar characteristics are 
sorted into the same vendor, and (3) CUs are more likely to leave the incumbent vendor when they are 
more different from other CUs using the same vendor. 
       Our finding is consistent with our hypothesis that vendors’ products are horizontally differentiated 
and it is less costly for vendors to serve CUs of similar types since they can avoid relationship-specific 
investment. To the extent that a CU’s preference is different from the vendor’s target, providing the 
product to the CU may require relationship-specific investment, involving adjustment of the products. 15 
 
Dependent on which vendor to transact with, a CU’s preference may become less specific or more 
specific as compared to the vendor’s typical CU. The need for the relationship-specific investment may be 
high for the case of DP transaction than software transaction, because DP is a more complete input for the 
CU. In the VIH case, because IT staffs perform DP for only their own CU, “relative” specificity of CU 
preference does not exist. This may explain why DP vendors enter only the thickest section of the market, 




Emmons, William and Frank A. Schmid (2000), “Bank Competition and Concentration: Do Credit 
Unions Matter?,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Review 82(3): 29-42. 
 
Hubbard, Thomas N. (2001), “Contractual Form and Market Thickness in Trucking,” RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 32, No.2, 369-386 
 
Klemperer, Paul (1995), “Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: an Overview with 
Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade,” Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 62, 515-539 
 
Lafontaine, Francine and Margaret Slade. (2007), “Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 45, 629-685 
  
Masten, Scott E. 1984. "The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry," 27 
Journal of Law and Economics 403-17. 
 
Monteverde, Kirk and David J Teece. (1982). "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the 
Automobile Industry," 13 Bell Journal of Economics 206-13. 
 
Oliver Williamson (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York; 
Free Press. 
 
Ono, Yukako (2007), “Market Thickness and Outsourcing Services”, Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, Vol. 37, No. 2, 220-238 
 
Pirrong, Stephen (1993), “Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: a Transactions Cost 
Explanation,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXXVI, 937-975 
 
Stango, Victor and Christopher R. Knittel “The productivity Benefit of IT Outsourcing” mimeo 
 
Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1998), “The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4, 73-94 
 
Seetharaman, P., Andrew Ainslie and Pradeep Chintagunta (1999), "Investigating household state 
dependence effects across categories." Journal of Marketing Research 36(4), pp. 488-500. 17 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 CU characteristics 
 5
th   10
th 25
th Median  75
th 90
th 95th 
N. of members  371 585 1,325 3,272 9,010  24,433 43,034
Log N. of members  5.9 6.4 7.2 8.1 9.1  10.1 10.7
Assets (mil $)  0.52 0.91 2.6 8.3 28  91 190
N .  o f  a d v a n c e d  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s   11246   78
 
 
Table 2 The number of CUs per vendor for a given mode 
June, 2003 
 Any  services  VIH  VOL 
   Allvendors  All  vendors 




N. of CU clients per vendor for a given mode 
25
th percentile  23.5  12  13.5 
Median vendor  60.5  46  23.5 
75
th percentile  142.5  158  56 
 
 
Table 3 Within-vendor CU characteristics for a given mode 
June, 2003 
 All  modes  VIH  VOL 
    All vendors  All vendors 
N. of vendors  40  34  24 
 
Median CU size per vendor  
25
th percentile  7.21  6.94  7.73 
Median   8.08  7.78  8.24 
75
th percentile  8.57  9.01  8.43 
 
Inter-quartile distance of CU sizes  
25
th percentile  .975  .908  .918 
Median   1.20  1.15  1.06 
75
th percentile  1.50  1.48  1.25 
 
Standard deviation of CU size per vendor  
25
th percentile  .75  .74  .72 
Median   .89  .88  .83 
75




Table 4 When does a CU switch out of an incumbent vendor? 
Dependent variable: Switch_out=1 if a CU switches vendor between t and t+1 
 





Fixed effect logit (within CU 
variation across time) 
   Coef.  Robust s.e.  Coef.  Robust s.e.
Abs. relative dist. to a vendor’s typical CU   0.388***  0.0471  1.10***  0.145 
D=1 if a CU offers the max N. of financial product among CUs 









CU size   -0.0986***  0.0354  -0.115  0.560 
The vendor’s share in a CU’s region   -1.27***  0.209  -3.69***  0.618 
D=1 if a CU uses the same vendors for last 5 years   -0.829***  0.147  2.72***  0.173 
Vendor size: log  sum of members of a vendor’s CU clients   -0.221***  0.0531  -0.254***  0.0781 
SD of CU sizes at a vendor   0.378**  0.183  0.907**  0.402 
Field of membership dummy   Yes  Yes 
Period dummy   Yes  Yes 
N. of observations   42309  7576 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
Robust s.e. with clustering over vendor-period for logit and robust s.e. for for fixed effect logit are used. 
 
Table 4-2. VOL 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 






Fixed effect logit (within CU 
variation across time)  
   Coef.   Robust s.e.   Coef.   Robust s.e.  
Abs. relative dist. to a vendor’s typical CU   0.289***  0.088  0.840*   0.428 
D=1 if a CU offers the max N. of financial product among CUs 









CU size   -0.08  0.051  -1.46  1.09 
The vendor’s share in a CU’s region   -1.66***  0.227  -4.48***   0.886 
D=1 if a CU uses the same vendors for last 5 years  -0.416***  0.152  4.63***   0.427 
Vendor size: log  sum of members of a vendor’s CU clients  -0.349*** 0.034  -0.658***  0.142 
SD of CU sizes at a vendor   -0.41   0.403  0.059  1.07 
Field of membership dummy   Yes   Yes  
Period dummy   Yes   Yes  




Table 5. Given that a CU switches vendors, which vendor does the CU chooses?  
 
Characteristics of vendors are evaluated at (t-1) and that of CU is evaluated at (t). 
VIH   VOL  
Abs. dist. to a vendor’s typical CU   -1.12***   -0.883*** 
D=1 if a CU’s N. of financial products (t) is greater than the vendor’s 
Max N. of financial products (t-1)   -14.9***   -13.2*** 
The vendor’s share in a CU’s region   2.56***   2.89*** 
SD of CU sizes at a vendor   -1.67***   -0.155 
Vendor size: Log  sum of members of the CU clients of a vendor   0.718***   0.778*** 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level;  













Figure 2 CU size distribution and choice between VIH and VOL 
Figure 2-1 CU size distribution by IT procurement form (June, 2003) 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Predicted probability for a CU to use VOL (June, 2003) 















Graphs by mode of procuring DP system22 
 
Figure 3 Within-vendor CU size distributions for each mode 
Center line in the shaded box indicates the median. Right line of the box is 75
th percentile, and left line is 
25
th percentile. Right adjacent line indicates the value that is approximately 1.5 times of the gap between 
25
th and 75
th percentile above from the 75
th percentile. Left adjacent line indicates the value that is 
approximately 1.5 times of the gap between 25
th and 75
th percentile below from the 25
th percentile. 
Figure 3-1 VIH 
 
Figure 3-2 VOL 
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Figure 4 The standardized distance between a CU and the vendor’s typical CU in terms of CU size: 
the change between two consecutive periods  
Figure 4-1 VIH 
 




Figure 5 Do CUs switch to vendors in different market segments? 
Figure 5-1 VIH: vendor switchers 
 





A 1 Within-vendor distribution of CU locations 
Here we show whether a vendor services a particular geographical area more intensely than others. For 
each procurement form, we compare the geographical distribution of CUs and that of a particular vendor's 
CU clients. It is often considered that the geography or the distance between suppliers and firms do not 
matter for IT service distributions, which may suggest even distribution of clients for a particular vendors. 
The data, however, seem to indicate the clients are unevenly distributed. 
    Table A.1 shows the comparison between the distribution of all CUs using VIH and that of three 
largest vendors. We also calculate the location quotients (LQ) that show how a given vendor's clients are 
concentrated in a particular area disproportionately to the overall CU distribution. There seem significant 
differences in geographical concentration of VIH services across vendors. The VIH users of FISERV are 
concentrated in the New England region 1.8 times more than the CUs using VIH, while those of 
JACKHENRY are concentrated in the East South Central region 2.5 times more than all CUs using VOL. 
Table 2 shows that such tendencies also exist among VOL vendors. While only 2.6% of CUs using VOL 
are in the Mountain area, 29% of Hearland Financial Service's CU clients are concentrated in that area. 
  26 
 
Table A1 Geographical concentration (location quotient) of a vendor’s CU clients  
(June, 2003) 











Distribution  Distribution LQ  Distribution LQ 
 
Distribution LQ 
 (1)  (2) (2)/(1) (3) (3)/(1)  (4) (4)/(1)
New England  6.40%  11.6% 1.81 5.14% .803  1.80% .282
Middle Atlantic  16.8%  12.8% .760 20.0% 1.19  6.96% .414
East North Central  20.7%  15.6% .753 15.8% .763  10.8% .523
West North Central  6.45%  9.03% 1.40 4.77% .740  2.58% .400
South Atlantic  13.5%  12.4% .917 18.3% 1.36  19.6% 1.45
East South Central  5.57%  3.89% .699 10.5% 1.88  13.9% 2.50
West South Central  11.8%  10.7% .906 16.5% 1.40  10.8% .920
Mountain 6.96%  7.48% 1.07 5.69% .817  6.70% .963
Pacific 11.9%  16.6% 1.40 3.30% .278  26.8% 2.26
 100%  100% 100%   100%
 













Distribution Distribution  LQ Distribution LQ 
 
Distribution LQ 
 (1)  (2) (2)/(1) (3) (3)/(1)  (4) (4)/(1)
New England  8.49%  8.56% 1.01     1.88% .221
Middle Atlantic  13.7%  13.5% .985     22.5% 1.64
East North Central  21.2%  20.0% .944 28.6% 1.35  10.6% .501
West North Central  6.63%  4.37% .659 9.52% 1.44  3.96% .597
South Atlantic  17.1%  27.0% 1.58     17.1% .999
East South Central  8.97%  2.91% .325     14.2% 1.58
West South Central  9.74%  7.1% .729 9.52% .978  15.6% 1.60
Mountain 2.63%  2.0% .762 28.6% 10.9  3.96% 1.51
Pacific 11.5%  14.6% 1.26 23.8% 2.06  10.2% .885
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